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Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC, 908 F.3d 437 (9th Cir. 2018) 
 
Brett Berntsen 
 
Part of a dispute some 66 million years in the making, Murray v. 
BEJ Minerals, LLC considered for the first time whether dinosaur 
fossils—specifically a one-of-a-kind specimen containing entombed 
“dueling dinosaurs”—qualified as “minerals” for the purposes of a 
property transaction under Montana law. Finding no consistent statutory 
or dictionary definition for “mineral,” the Ninth Circuit relied on a test 
previously utilized by the Montana Supreme Court to hold that the 
dinosaur fossils constituted minerals due to their rare and exceptional 
qualities and were therefore part of the property’s mineral estate. The 
decision was promptly nullified, however, as the Ninth Circuit granted a 
rehearing en banc and the Montana legislature passed a measure declaring 
dinosaur fossils part of the surface estate under state law.  
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
  
Through a series of property transactions over several decades, 
George, Jerry, and Robert Severson (the “Seversons”) divided ownership 
of their ranch in Garfield County, Montana (the “Ranch”) with Mary Ann 
and Lige Murray (the “Murrays”).1 Eventually, the Murrays acquired the 
Ranch’s entire surface and shared ownership of the mineral estate with the 
Seversons.2 Starting in 2006, the Murrays began discovering a number of 
unique dinosaur fossils on the property.3 Once informed of the discoveries, 
the Seversons asserted an ownership interest, prompting the Murrays to 
seek a declaratory judgment deeming the fossils part of the surface estate.4 
The Seversons counterclaimed, arguing the fossils were part of the mineral 
estate.5 
 Sitting in diversity, the United States District Court granted 
summary judgment for the Murrays, holding that dinosaur fossils did not 
fit the ordinary and natural meaning of mineral and therefore were not 
included in the mineral estate under Montana law.6 The Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals reversed, relying on a test previously utilized by the 
Montana Supreme Court to determine whether a substance is a mineral in 
the context of property transactions.7 
                                                          
1. Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC, 908 F.3d 437, 440 (9th Cir. 2018). 
2. Id.  
3. Id.  
4. Id. at 441. 
5. Id. 
6. Id.  
7. Id. at 446, 448; see Farley v. Booth Bros. Land & Livestock Co., 890 
P.2d 377 (Mont. 1995).   
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II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
In 1983, George Severson began leasing the Ranch to the 
Murrays, who worked for George as ranchers.8 George later transferred 
parts of his property interest to his sons, Jerry and Robert, and sold the rest 
to the Murrays.9 In 2005, the parties executed a mineral deed (“the Deed”) 
through which the Seversons sold their surface rights and one-third of their 
mineral rights to the Murrays.10 The Deed stated that the Seversons and 
Murrays would own the remaining two-thirds of the mineral estate as 
tenants in common, sharing “all right title and interest in and to all of the 
oil, gas, hydrocarbons, and minerals in, on and under, and that may be 
produced from the [Ranch].”11  
In 2006, commercial bone diggers mistakenly entered the Ranch 
and discovered fossil remains of two dinosaurs locked in combat.12 The 
diggers partnered with the Murrays and excavations began.13 Over the next 
few years, multiple fossils were discovered on the Ranch, including the 
“dueling dinosaurs,” a nearly complete Tyrannosaurus Rex skeleton and 
“one of the best . . . Triceratops skull[s] ever found.”14 The fossils 
(collectively “the Montana Fossils”) are considered to contain “huge 
scientific value” and were appraised at millions of dollars.15 
In 2008, the Murrays informed the Seversons of the discoveries 
and the Seversons claimed an ownership interest. In response, the Murrays 
sought a Montana state court judgement declaring that “as owners of the 
surface estate . . . they [were] the sole owners of the Montana Fossils.”16 
The Seversons, as residents of Florida, removed the action to federal court 
through diversity and filed a counterclaim asserting that the Montana 
Fossils were instead part of the mineral estate.17 
The United States District Court for the District of Montana 
granted summary judgment for the Murrays, ruling that the Montana 
Fossils were “not included in the ordinary and natural meaning of 
‘mineral’ under Montana law, and therefore [were] not part of the mineral 
estate.”18 The Seversons appealed and a three-judge panel reviewed the 
matter de novo, analyzing the issue under Montana law.19 Despite the 
                                                          
8. Id. at 440. 
9. Id.  
10. Id.  
11. Id.  
12. Mike Sager, Will the Public Ever Get to See the “Dueling 
Dinosaurs”?, SMITHSONIAN MAGAZINE, July 2017, 
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/public-ever-see-dueling-dinosaurs-
180963676/.  
13. Id. 
14. Murray, 908 F.3d at 440–441.  
15. Id. 
16. Id. at 441. 
17. Id. at 439, n.2. 
18. Id. at 441. 
19. Id. 
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“novel question” and “potential policy implications,” the parties did not 
request certification of the question to the Montana Supreme Court.20 
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
 
Noting that deeds conveying property interests are assessed 
through the rules of contract interpretation under Montana law, the court 
first looked at the potential meanings of “mineral” to determine whether 
the Deed’s language encompassed the Montana Fossils.21 Finding this 
inquiry inconclusive, the court then evaluated how a substance qualifies 
as a mineral in a property transaction under Montana law.22 Finally, the 
court addressed several policy arguments concerning particular tests 
proffered by the parties.23  
 
A. Meaning of Mineral 
 
The court stated that contract language is interpreted in its 
“ordinary and popular sense” unless the parties use words technically or 
give them special meaning.24 Although a word’s “ordinary and popular” 
meaning is typically drawn from dictionary definitions, the court noted 
that “mineral” is notorious for having multiple definitions.25 For example, 
both the Seversons and Murrays agreed that the Montana Fossils were 
composed entirely of hydroxylapatite or francolite, both considered 
inorganic minerals.26 Therefore, the Montana Fossils qualified as minerals 
in a scientific sense and as defined in a host of dictionaries, including 
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, the New Oxford American 
Dictionary, and Black’s Law Dictionary.27  
Nevertheless, courts have also applied narrower use-related 
definitions.28 The district court found that fossils were not minerals 
because fossils were not discovered via traditional mining techniques nor 
subject to “further refinement before becoming economically exploitable,” 
like oil, gas, and coal.29 Conversely, however, the Ninth Circuit noted that 
the Montana Fossils were indeed used for economic and commercial 
                                                          
20. Id. at 448, n.1 (Murguia, J., dissenting). 
21. Id. at 441–442. The court clarified that the term “surface estate” is a 
“misnomer,” and includes everything except minerals, including property under the 
surface of the land. The mineral estate, meanwhile, comprises all minerals found on a 
property, including those found on the surface. Id. at n.1. 
22. Id. at 443–444. 
23. Id. at 445. 
24. Id. at 442 (quoting Dollar Plus Stores, Inc. v. R-Montana Assocs., 
L.P., P.3d 216, 219 (Mont. 2009)).  
25. Id. (quoting Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Soderberg, 188 U.S. 526, 530 
(1901)).  
26. Id. at 442, n.6.  
28. Id. at 442. 
28. Id. at 443. 
29. Id.; see Murray v. Billings Garfield Land Co., 187 F. Supp. 3d 1203, 
1212 (D. Mont. 2016). 
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purposes, as some had sold for millions of dollars to museums which 
charge admission fees.30 Moreover, the court stated that “mineral” has 
never been limited to fuel substances. Oil, gas, and coal all “derive from 
the remains of plants and animals” and should not receive disparate 
treatment because they are valued for different reasons.31 
Finally, the court observed that a previous edition of Black’s Law 
Dictionary defined mineral to include “all fossil bodies” dug out of mines 
or quarries.32 Considering the inconsistent dictionary definitions, the court 
held that the Deed’s plain language did not exclude dinosaur fossils.  
 
B. Montana Law 
 
The court observed that Montana—like the rest of the nation—has 
long labored to “make sense of the legal morass regarding the term 
‘mineral.’”33 The Montana Supreme Court first addressed the meaning of 
the word for a land transfer agreement in Farley v. Booth Brothers Land 
and Livestock Company.34 Finding no statutory definition, the Farley court 
surveyed surrounding case law and settled on a test enunciated by the 
Texas Supreme Court in Heinatz v. Allen.35 This Heinatz test declared that 
substances like sand and gravel do not qualify as minerals within the 
word’s ordinary and natural meaning unless they have some rare and 
exceptional character or property which gives them special value.36 
The Seversons argued that the Montana Supreme Court adopted 
the Heinatz test in Farley and therefore the Montana Fossils constituted 
minerals because they were both mineral in the technical sense and 
possessed rare and exceptional properties which gave them special value.37 
In response, the Murrays contended that the Montana Supreme Court did 
not adopt the Heinatz test in Farley and merely used it as a “secondary 
reference.”38 Rather than rely on this secondary reference, the Murrays 
urged the court to determine the meaning of mineral based on definitions 
from a host of state statutes and regulations which had “never” included 
dinosaur fossils.39 Alternatively, the Murrays asserted that if the Heinatz 
test was adopted in Farley, it was considered categorical, meaning that all 
dinosaur fossils must qualify as minerals for any particular fossil to also 
qualify.40 In other words, because some dinosaur fossils are “virtually 
worthless,” dinosaur fossils in general do not exhibit the rare and 
                                                          
30. Murray, 908 F.3d at 443. 
31. Id. at 443–444 (footnote omitted). 
32. Id. at 444 (citing Mineral, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 
1990)). 
33. Id. (citing Farley v. Booth Bros. Land & Livestock Co., 890 P.2d 377 
(Mont. 1995)).  
34. Id. at 444–445 (citing Farley, 890 P.2d at 379). 
35. Id.  
36. Id. (quoting Heinatz v. Allen, 217 S.W.2d 994 (Tex. 1949)). 
37. Id. at 445.  
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
41. Id. 
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exceptional properties necessary to qualify as minerals.41 The Murrays 
maintained that adopting this categorical approach would reduce 
confusion and litigation over whether a fossil is rare and exceptional 
enough to be considered a mineral.42 
The court first noted that the statutory definitions of mineral 
offered by the Murrays were contradictory and thus inconclusive.43 Many 
of the definitions actually encompassed dinosaur fossils, and the ones that 
did not were irrelevant.44 Next, the court stated that while the Montana 
Supreme Court in Farley did not explicitly adopt the Heinatz test, it 
applied the test fourteen years later when faced with a similar dispute.45 
This repeated reliance demonstrated that the Montana Supreme Court had 
“generally adopted the Heinatz test” to determine whether a substance is a 
mineral for the purposes of a property transaction.46  
Additionally, the court recognized that although the 
Heinatz/Farley “rare and exceptional” standard may generate some 
“unpredictability,” the Montana Supreme Court indicated the test was not 
intended to be categorical.47 Notably, the Farley decision mentioned 
common substances like sand which may be valuable for making glass, 
which in turn implied that sand may exist which is “not valuable for 
making glass.”48 Accordingly, Farley did not hold that all sand is 
precluded from being a mineral just because some sand is worthless.49 
Thus, under Farley, the court found the Montana Fossils were minerals 
according to Deed’s terms and belonged to the mineral estate’s owners.50 
 
C. Additional Policy-Based Arguments 
 
The Murrays also argued that the Heinatz/Farley test did not 
reflect the ordinary meaning of the word “mineral,” would cause needless 
litigation to determine rareness, and could jeopardize museum ownership 
of fossil collections.51 As a federal court sitting in diversity, the court 
concluded it was “not free to impose [its] policy preferences over those of 
the Montana Supreme Court,” dismissing the Murrays’ arguments as 
meritless.52 The court explained that, because the underlying purpose of 
owning a mineral estate is to “extract something valuable from the land,”53 
                                                          
42. Id. 
42. Id.  
43. Id. at 445–446. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. at 446; see Hart v. Craig, 216 P.3d 197, 198 (Mont. 2009). 
46. Murray, 908 F.3d at 446. The court explained that its task when 
sitting in diversity was to predict how the respective state court would decide the issue. 
Id. at n.10. 
47. Id. at 447. 
48. Id. (citing Farley, 890 P.2d at 379 (Mont. 1995)). 
49. Id.  
50. Id. 
51. Id.  
52. Id.  
53. Id.  
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tying the definition of mineral to a substance’s value is logical and reflects 
the ordinary and natural meaning of the term.54 Additionally, the broad 
definition of “value” used in Heinatz would prevent excessive litigation 
with respect to “rareness.” Finally, any concerns over museum collection 
ownership were merely “hypothetical” and easily resolved.55 
 
DISSENT 
 
 The dissent disagreed with the majority’s focus on the rare and 
exceptional qualities of a substance, arguing instead that Heinatz stood for 
an “ordinary and natural meaning test,” which assessed “the nature of the 
[substance], its relation to the surface of the land, its use and value, and 
the method and effect of its removal.”56 Conceding that fossils qualify as 
minerals scientifically, the dissent nevertheless argued fossils “pertain 
much more closely to the surface of the land.”57 Like the limestone at 
question in Heinatz, fossils are excavated rather than mined, which 
interferes significantly with the surface estate.58  The dissent also observed 
that fossils are used and valued differently than hydrocarbons and other 
minerals extracted for refinement and economic purposes. Fossils, 
meanwhile, derive value from characteristics like completeness and 
specimen species, not mineral composition.59 Thus, the dissent agreed 
with the district court’s conclusion that fossils were not included in the 
“ordinary and natural meaning of the term ‘minerals,’” used in the Deed.60 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
Murray illustrates the difficulty of determining what constitutes a 
“mineral” under Montana law. By adhering to the “rare and exceptional” 
test, rather than a narrower, use-based definition, Murray opened the door 
for novel substances like dinosaur fossils to qualify as minerals and 
become part of a property’s mineral estate. The potential ramifications and 
disruptive nature of the holding elicited prompt reaction. The Ninth Circuit 
granted rehearing en banc, stripping the decision of precedential value.61 
Meanwhile, the Montana legislature passed a bill which criticized Murray 
as a “threat to private property rights” and declared dinosaur fossils as part 
of a property’s surface estate under state statute.62 
                                                          
54. Id.  
55. Id. The court noted that if a mineral estate owner successfully sued a 
museum over its fossil collection, the museum would be entitled to a refund from 
whomever sold the fossils without full ownership. Id. at n.11.  
56. Id. at 449 (Murguia, J., dissenting) (citing Heinatz, 217 S.W.2d at 
995–996).  
57. Id. 
58. Id.  
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. Order, April 4, 2019, No. 1:14-cv-00106-SPW. 
62. Clarify Dinosaur Bones and Fossils are Part of Surface Estate, H.R. 
229, 66th Leg., 2019 Sess. (Mont. 2019).  
